BOOK EIGHT
51 BC AD
1. The Gaul whole was vanquished; Since the previous summer, Caesar had not ceased to fight, and he wanted to give the soldiers, after so much fatigue, the refreshing rest of winter quarters: but then it was learned that a large number of cities at the times started making war plans and plotting again. This attitude was explained by probable reasons: all the Gallic had realized that with the most numerous troops, if they were concentrated in one place, the Romans could not be resisted, but that if several peoples attacked them at the same time at various points, the Roman army would not wouldn't have enough resources, time or manpower to deal with everything; should some city suffer from it, it had to accept the test, if by thus retaining the enemy it would allow the others to reconquer their independence.
2. Caesar did not want to let the Gauls fortify themselves in this idea: entrusting his quaestor Marcus Antonius with the command of his winter quarters, he left Bibracte, the day before the Calends of January, with an escort of horsemen, to join the thirteenth legion, which he had placed near the Aedui frontier, in the country of the Bituriges; he added to it the eleventh, which was the nearest. Leaving two cohorts of each to guard the baggage, he took the rest of the troops to the most fertile countryside of the Bituriges: this people had a vast territory, where the towns were numerous, and the wintering of a single legion had not could have been enough to prevent him from preparing for war and forming conspiracies.
3. The sudden arrival of Caesar produced the effect it must necessarily produce on the people surprised and dispersed while, very quietly, they cultivated their fields, the cavalry fell on them before they could take refuge in the cities. . For even the sign that commonly signals an enemy incursion, an order from Caesar had suppressed it: he had forbidden the setting fire to the buildings, so as not to run out of fodder and wheat, in case he wanted to advance further. away, and to prevent the sight of the fires from giving the alarm. Several thousand prisoners had been taken, and terror had spread among the Bituriges: those who had been able to escape the first approach of the Romans had taken refuge with their neighbours, relying on ties of private hospitality or alliance that united peoples. In vain because Caesar, by forced marches, shows himself everywhere, and gives no city time to think of the salvation of others rather than his own; by this promptness he kept friendly peoples in duty, and those who hesitated he led them by terror to accept peace. Faced with such a situation, seeing that Caesar's clemency made it possible for them to become his friends again and that the neighboring cities, without being in any way punished, had been allowed to give hostages and to submit, the Bituriges followed their example.
4. To reward his soldiers for having endured such a hard campaign with so much patience, for having shown the most perfect perseverance in the season of short days, in very difficult stages, in intolerable cold, Caesar promises them, as gratuity in lieu of booty, two hundred sesterces per head, one thousand for the centurions; then he sends the legions back to their quarters and returns to Bibracte after an absence of forty days. As he was rendering justice there, the Bituriges sent him an embassy to ask for help against the Carnutes, who, they complained, had declared war on them. At this news, although he had only stayed eighteen days at Bibracte, he called from their winter quarters, on the Saone, the fourteenth and sixth legions, which had been placed there, as we have seen. seen at book precedent, to ensure the provisioning, and it thus leaves with two legions to go to chastise the Carnutes.
5. When these hear of the approach of an army, they remember the misfortunes of others and, leaving their villages and towns, where they dwelt in narrow makeshift buildings which they had quickly built to able to pass the winter (for their recent defeat had cost them a large number of cities), they fled in all directions. Caesar, not wanting to expose the soldiers to the rigors of the bad season which was then in full swing, camped in the capital of the Carnutes, Cenabum, where he piled up his troops, part in the houses of the Gauls, part in the shelters that had been formed by quickly throwing thatch on the tents. However, he sent cavalry and auxiliary infantry wherever the enemy was said to have retreated; and not without success, for ours most often return laden with booty. The difficulties of winter, the fear of danger overwhelmed the Carnutes; chased from their homes, they dared not make a prolonged stop anywhere, and their forests did not protect them between the extreme violence of the bad weather: they ended up dispersing among the peoples of the neighborhood, not without having lost a large part of theirs.
6. Caesar, judging that it was enough, at the height of the bad season, to disperse the groups which were forming, in order to prevent by this means the outbreak of a war, having on the other hand the conviction, as much as one could reasonably foresee, that no great war could break out while one was still in winter quarters, confided his two legions to Caius Trebonius, with orders to winter at Cenabum; as for him, as frequent embassies from the Remi warned him that the Bellovaci, whose military glory surpassed that of all the Gauls and Belgians, united with the neighboring peoples under the leadership of the Bellovaci Corréos and the Atrébate Commios, were mobilizing and were concentrating their forces, with the intention of making a mass attack against the Suessions, whom he had placed under the authority of the Remi, considering, on the other hand, that his interest as much as his honor demanded that he should not be no harm to the allies whom Rome had every reason to praise, he recalled the eleventh legion, also wrote to Caius Fabius to bring the two legions he had to the Suessions, and asked Labienus for one of his two . It was thus that, insofar as the distribution of quarters and military necessities permitted, he made the legions endure only in turn, without ever resting himself, the fatigues of the expeditions.
7. When he has collected these troops, he marches against the Bellovaci, encamps in their territory, and sends in all directions detachments of cavalry to take some prisoners who can teach him the designs of the enemy. The horsemen, having acquitted themselves of their mission, report that they found only a few men in the houses – and who had not remained to cultivate their fields (for a careful evacuation had been carried out). total), but who had been sent away to do espionage. By asking these men where the bulk of the population was and what were the intentions of the Bellovaci, Caesar obtained the following information: all the Bellovaci able to bear arms had gathered in one place, and with them the Ambians , the Aulerci, the Caletes, the Veliocasses, the Atrebates; they had chosen for their camp a dominant position, in the middle of a wood surrounded by a marsh, and they had collected all their baggage in the forests situated in the rear. Many were the leaders who had pushed for war, but it was above all Correos that the masses obeyed, because he was known to be animated by a particularly violent hatred against Rome. A few days earlier, the Atrebate Commios had left the camp to seek reinforcements from the germans, which were nearby and in infinite numbers. The plan of the Bellovaci, drawn up with the unanimous opinion of the chiefs and enthusiastically approved by the people, was as follows: if, as it was said, Caesar came with three legions, they would offer the fight, in order not to be forced later to fight with the whole army under much harsher conditions; if he brought larger forces, they would not quit their chosen position, but they would prevent the Romans, by setting up ambushes, from foraging, which, in view of the season, was scarce and scattered, and from get wheat and other food.
8. Caesar, in possession of this information, which was confirmed by the agreement of numerous testimonies, judging that the plan presented to him was very wise and very far from the ordinary recklessness of the Barbarians, decided that he must do everything so that the enemy, despising the weakness of its numbers, gave battle as soon as possible. He had, indeed, with him his oldest legions, of out-of-line value, the seventh, eighth and ninth, plus another, the eleventh, of which much could be expected, which was composed of excellent elements , but which nevertheless, after eight years of campaigns, had not given me, compared to the others, the same reputation for proven solidity. He therefore convenes a council, exposes all he has learned, strengthens the courage of the troops. To try to draw the enemy into battle by showing him only three legions, he regulated the order of march as follows: the seventh, eighth and ninth legions would go forward; next would come the baggage, which, although all grouped together, formed only a fairly thin column, as is the custom in expeditions; the eleventh legion would bring up the rear: thus we would avoid showing the enemy numbers superior to what he wanted. While observing this disposition, one almost forms a square, and the army thus drawn up comes into sight of the enemy sooner than he expected.
9. When suddenly the Gauls see the legions advancing with a firm step and arrayed as in battle, they whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar, either because the idea of danger then intimidates them, or that the suddenness of our approach surprises them, or that they want to await our decisions, they content themselves with arranging their troops in front of the camp without leaving the height. Caesar had wanted battle but, surprised at the sight of such a multitude, separated from him by a valley deeper than wide, he established his camp opposite the enemy camp. He built a rampart twelve feet high, with a parapet proportionate to that height, dug two ditches fifteen feet wide with vertical walls, erected numerous three-storey towers, threw bridges between them protected on the exterior side by parapets of 'wicker: in this way the camp was defended by a double ditch and by a double row of defenders, one who, from the footbridges, less exposed because of the height of his position, could launch his darts with more assurance and at longer range, the other which was placed nearer to the assailant, on the rampart itself, and which the footbridge sheltered from the fall of the projectiles. He filled the gates with casements and flanked them with taller towers.
10. The purpose of this fortification was twofold. The importance of the works was, by making people believe that Caesar was afraid, to encourage the Barbarians; on the other hand, as it was necessary to go far to make fodder and to obtain corn, weak effectives could ensure the defense of the camp, which its fortifications already protected. It frequently happened that, on either side, small groups advanced at a run and skirmished between the two camps, without crossing the marsh; Perfectly, however, it was crossed either by our Gallic or German auxiliaries who then vigorously pursued the enemy, or by the enemy himself who, in his turn, pushed us back quite a distance; it also happened, as one went every day to forage - and the inconvenience was inevitable, because the barns where one had to go to take the hay were rare and scattered -, that in places of difficult access isolated foragers were wrapped; these incidents caused us only rather light losses of beasts and valets, but they inspired the Barbarians with insane hopes, and this all the more so since Commios who, as I have said, had gone to seek German auxiliaries, had just come from arriving with horsemen: they were not more than five hundred, but that the Germans were there, it was enough to excite the Barbarians.
11. Caesar, seeing that the days passed and that the enemy remained in his camp under the protection of a marsh and with the advantage of a very strong natural position, that it could not be attacked without a murderous struggle and that in order to invest it a more numerous army was needed, wrote to Caius Trebonius to call as quickly as possible the thirteenth legion, which was wintering with the legate Titus Sextius among the Bituriges, and, having thus three legions, to come the find at large steps; in the meantime, he borrowed in turn from the cavalry of the Remes, Lingones and other peoples, of which he had mobilized a strong contingent, detachments which he charged with ensuring the protection of the foragers by supporting the sudden attacks of the 'enemy.
12. Every day we proceeded in this way, and already habit led to negligence, the ordinary consequence of routine; the Bellovaci, who knew where our horsemen were trailing every day, have elite infantry set up an ambush in a wooded place, and send horsemen there the next day, who will first have to attract ours, so that then the people from the ambush surround them and attack them. Bad luck fell on the Remes, whose day of service it was. Suddenly noticing enemy horsemen, as they were the most numerous and felt only contempt for this handful of men, they pursued them with too much ardor, and were surrounded on all sides by the infantry. Surprised by this attack, they retired at a faster pace than the ordinary rule of a cavalry fight requires, and lost the first magistrate of their city, Vertiscos, who commanded the cavalry: he could hardly, because of his great age, to keep on horseback, but, according to the custom of the Gauls, he had not wanted this reason to dispense him from the command, nor that we fought without him. This success – and the death of the civilian and military leader of the Remes – makes the enemy proud and excited; ours learn at their expense to reconnoiter the places with more care before establishing their posts, and to pursue with more prudence when the enemy yields the ground.
13. However, not a day goes by that does not fight within sight of the two camps, at fordable places in the marsh. During one of these engagements, the Germans whom Caesar had brought from beyond the Rhine to make them fight, mixed with the horsemen, resolutely crossed the swamp together, killed the few enemies who resisted and vigorously pursued the mass. others ; fear seized the enemy not only those who were close together or whom the projectiles reached from afar, but even the troops who were, as usual, placed in support at a good distance, shamefully fled and, dislodged several Recovering from dominant positions, they only stopped once they were in the shelter of their camp: some even, confused about their conduct, fled beyond. This adventure demoralized the entire enemy army so much that it was impossible to tell which had the upper hand, their insolence at the slightest success or their fright at the slightest reverse.
14. Several days passed without their moving from this camp; when they learn that the legions and the legate Caius Trebonius are at a short distance, the chiefs of the Bellovaci, fearing a blockade like that of Alesia, send back during the night those who are too old, or too weak, or without weapons, and with them all the baggage. They were busy putting order in the column where agitation and confusion reigned (the Gauls have the habit, even for the bravest expeditions, of being followed by a crowd of wagons), when the day surprises them: they line up armed troops in front of the camp, to prevent the Romans from pursuing them before the column of baggage is already at a certain distance. Caesar, if he did not think he had to attack forces ready to resist when it was necessary to climb such a steep hill, did not hesitate on the other hand to advance his legions far enough so that the Barbarians, under the threat of our troops, could not leave the premises without danger. Seeing therefore that the two camps were separated by the swamp which formed a serious obstacle and capable of preventing a rapid pursuit, observing on the other hand that the height which, on the other side of the swamp, almost touched the enemy camp, in was separated by a small valley, he threw footbridges over the marsh, had his legions cross it, and promptly reached the plateau which crowned the hill and which a rapid loss protected on both flanks. There, he reformed his legions, then, having reached the end of the plateau, ranged them in line on a site from which the artillery projectiles could reach the enemy formations.
15. The Barbarians, confident in their position, did not refuse to fight if the Romans ever tried to storm the hill; as for sending back their troops little by little in small packets, they could not do so without having to fear that the dispersion would demoralize them: they therefore remained in line. When he sees them well decided, Caesar, leaving twenty cohorts under arms, traces a camp at this place and orders that it be fortified. The work completed, he arranges the legions in front of the entrenchment, places the horsemen in full guard with their horses all bridled. The Bellovaci, seeing that the Romans were ready to pursue, and being unable, on the other hand, either to watch all night, or to remain on the spot without risk any longer, had recourse to the following stratagem to withdraw. Passing from hand to hand the bales of straw and the fascines which had served as their seats – we have seen in Caesar's previous comments that the Gauls are in the habit of sitting on a fascine – and of which there was in the camp a large quantity, they placed them in front of their line and, at the close of day, at a given signal, they set them all on fire together. In this way, a curtain of fire suddenly concealed all their troops from the sight of the Romans. The Barbarians took advantage of this moment to flee at full speed.
16. The barrier of fires concealed from Caesar the retreat of the enemies; but, suspecting that they had kindled them to facilitate their flight, he carried the legions forward and launched the cavalry in pursuit; however, fearing a trap, should the intention of the enemy be to hold their position and draw us into unfavorable ground, they themselves advance only slowly. The riders hesitated to enter the smoke and the flames which were very thick; those who, more daring, penetrated there, hardly saw the heads of their horses: they feared an ambush, and left the Bellovaques to retire freely. Thus this flight, in which fear and skill were mingled, enabled them to gain without being in any way disturbed, at a distance of ten miles at the most, a very strong position where they established their camp. From there, often placing infantry and cavalry in ambush, they did great harm to the Romans when they went forage.
17. These incidents multiplied, when Caesar learned from a prisoner that Correos, chief of the Bellovaci, having formed a troop of six thousand particularly valiant infantry and a thousand horsemen chosen among all, had placed them in ambush at a place where he suspected that the abundance of wheat and fodder would attract the Romans. Informed of this plan, he brought out more legions than usual and sent forward the cavalry, which was still escorting the foragers; he mixes in lightly armed auxiliaries; himself, at the head of the legions, approaches as near as possible.
18. The enemies placed in ambush had chosen for the action that they meditated a plain which did not extend more than a thousand paces in any direction, and which was defended on all sides by woods or a river very difficult to cross. ; they were lying in wait around, enveloping him like a net. Ours, who had realized the intentions of the enemy, and who were equipped for the fight and desired it, because, feeling supported by the legions which followed, it was not of fight which they did not accepted, entered the plain squadron by squadron. Seeing them arrive, Correos thought he had the opportunity to act: he began by showing up with a small number of men and charging the first units. Ours firmly support the shock, avoiding meeting in a compact group, a formation which generally, in cavalry combats, when it is the effect of some panic, makes its very number formidable for the troops.
19. The squadrons had each taken up position and engaged only small groups which took turns avoiding letting the fighters take the flank: then, while Correos was fighting, the others came out of the woods. Sharp combats engage in two directions. As the action continued without decision, the bulk of the infantry, in battle order, gradually emerged from the woods: they forced our cavalry to retreat. But these are promptly succored by the light infantry which, as I have said, had been sent ahead of the legions, and, mixed with our squadrons, they fight on a firm footing. For a while, we fight on equal terms; then, as the natural law of battle would have it, those who had been the first to be attacked had the upper hand by the very fact that the ambush had caused them no effect of surprise. In the meantime, the legions are approaching, and simultaneously ours and the enemy learn from numerous liaison officers that the general-in-chief is there with forces ready. At this news, our cavalry, reassured by the support of the cohorts, display extreme vigor, not wishing to share with the legions, if they do not lead the action briskly enough, the honor of victory; the enemies lose heart and look everywhere for ways to flee. In vain: the land which they had wanted to make a trap for the Romans became a trap for them. Beaten, jostled, having lost most of their people, they nevertheless managed to flee in disorder, some reaching the woods, others the river; but, while they fled, ours, in the course of a vigorous pursuit, finished them off. However Correos, whom no misfortune defeats, does not resolve to give up the fight and gain the woods, and he does not yield either to the summons of our people who invite him to surrender; but, fighting with great courage and hurting many people, he ended by forcing the victors, carried away by anger, to overwhelm him with their darts.
20. Thus the matter had just ended when Caesar came upon the field of battle; he thought that after such a disaster the enemy, when news of it should reach him, would no longer remain in his camp, the distance of which to the place of carnage was, it was said, only about eight miles: also, though the river presented him with a serious obstacle, he forced it through his army and marched forward. The Bellovaci and the other peoples suddenly saw the few fugitives arrive, in small numbers and wounded, whom the woods had preserved from the massacre: faced with such a complete misfortune, learning of the defeat, the death of Correos, the loss of their cavalry and their best infantry, not doubting that the Romans were approaching, they immediately summoned the assembly to the sound of trumpets and proclaimed that deputies and hostages must be sent to Caesar.
21. All approve of the measure; but Commios the Atrebate fled to the Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries for this war. The others immediately send deputies to Caesar; they ask him to be content with a punishment which no doubt, given his clemency and kindness, if it were in his power to inflict it without a fight on enemies whose forces were intact, he would never do them undergo. “The cavalry forces of the Bellovaci have been annihilated; several thousand elite infantrymen perished, barely able to escape those who announced the disaster. However, this fight brought the Bellovaci a great good, insofar as such misfortune can include: Corréos, author responsible for the war, agitator of the people, was killed. Never, in fact, so long as he lived, was the power of the senate so strong as that of the ignorant plebs. »
22. To these prayers of the deputies, Caesar replies by reminding them that the previous year the Bellovaci entered the war at the same time as the other peoples of Gaul, and that alone among all they persevered stubbornly, without the surrender others would bring them back to reason. He knows very well that the responsibility for faults is very willingly placed on the account of the dead. But, in truth, no one is powerful enough to be able to bring about war and conduct it against the will of the chiefs, despite the opposition of the senate and the resistance of all good people, with the only assistance of a plebs. without authority. Nevertheless, he will be content with the punishment they have brought upon themselves. »
23. The following night, the deputies bring back to theirs the answer obtained, they gather the necessary hostages. The deputies of the other peoples, who were watching the outcome of the Bellovaci embassy, rushed in. They give hostages, carry out the imposed conditions; only Commios abstains, because he was too afraid to confide his existence to anyone. It is that indeed the previous year Titus Labienus, in the absence of Caesar who dispensed justice in Citerior Gaul, having learned that Commios was intriguing with the cities and forming a coalition against Caesar, believed that it was possible to stifle his treachery without any breach of loyalty. As he did not think he would come to the camp, if invited, he would not arouse his suspicion by trying, and sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus with a mission to kill him under the pretense of an interview. He added to him centurions specially chosen for this task. The interview was taking place, and Volusenus - it was the agreed signal - had just seized Commios's hand: but the centurion, either because he was troubled by this new role for him, or because Commios' familiars had promptly arrested, could not finish off his victim: the first blow he gave him nevertheless seriously injured his head. On both sides we had drawn, but everyone thought less of fighting than of clearing a way to flee: ours, in fact, believed that Commios had received a mortal wound, and the Gauls, understanding that there was had a trap set, feared the danger was beyond what they saw. Following this affair Commios, it was said, had resolved never to find himself in the presence of any Roman.
24. Winner of the most warlike nations, Caesar, seeing that there was no longer any city that was preparing a war of resistance, but that on the other hand many were the inhabitants who abandoned the cities, deserted the countryside to avoid obey the Romans, decides to distribute his army in several regions. He joins the quaestor Marcus Antonius with the twelfth legion. He sends the legate Laius Fabius with twenty-five cohorts to the other end of Gaul, because he heard that there certain peoples were in arms, and that the two legions of the legate Laius Caninius Rebilus, who was in these countries did not seem to him solid enough. He calls Titus Labienus to his side; the fifteenth legion, which had spent the winter with the latter, he sent to Gaul, which enjoyed the right of citizenship to ensure the protection of the colonies of Roman citizens, thus wishing to prevent a descent of Barbarians from inflicting a misfortune similar to that suffered the previous summer by the Tergestines, who had been suddenly attacked and pillaged by them. For his part, he leaves to ravage and ransack the country of Ambiorix; having given up the hope of reducing this character, although he had forced him to tremble and flee, he judged that his honor demanded at least this satisfaction: to make his country a desert, to destroy everything there, men, houses , cattle, so much so that Ambiorix, abhorred by his people, - if fate allowed that there were any left - would no longer have any means, because of such disasters, of returning to his city.
25. He directed over all parts of the territory of Ambiorix, either legions or auxiliaries, and massacring, burning, plundering, brought desolation everywhere; a large number of men were killed or taken prisoner. He then sends Labienus with two legions to the Treveri. This people, because of the neighborhood of Germania, was trained in warfare, which they waged daily; his primitive civilization and his barbarous mores made him quite similar to the Germans, and he never obeyed except under the pressure of an army.
26. Meanwhile, the legate Laius Caninius, informed that a great multitude of enemies had gathered in the country of the Pictons by a letter and messengers from Duratios, who had remained constantly faithful to the friendship of the Romans then that a sizable part of his city had defected, headed for the town of Lemonum. As he approached, he got more precise information from the prisoners: several thousand men, led by Dumnacos, chief of the Andes, besieged Duratios in Lemonum; not daring to risk in an encounter weak legions. he encamped in a strong position. Dumnacos, having learned of Caninius' arrival, turned all his forces against the legions and set out to attack the Roman camp. After having vainly spent several days there without succeeding, despite great sacrifices, in taking any part of the intrenchments, he returned to besiege Lemonum.
27. At the same time, the legate Caius Fabius, while he receives the submission of a large number of cities and sanctions it by having hostages handed over to him, learns by a letter from Caninius what is happening among the Pictons. At this news, he goes to the aid of Duratios. But Dumnacos, on learning of Fabius's approach, thought he was lost if he had to suffer both the attack of the Romans of Caninius and that of an enemy from without, while having to watch and fear the people of Lémonum: he therefore withdrew immediately, and judged that he would not be safe until he had sent his troops to the other side of the Loire, a river which could not be crossed, in because of its width, than on a bridge. Fabius had not yet come in sight of the enemy and had not yet joined Caninius; however, informed by those who knew the country, he preferred to stop at the idea that the enemy, driven by fear, would win the region that he was actually winning. Consequently, he goes with his troops to the same bridge and orders the horsemen to go ahead of the legions, but retaining the possibility of returning to the common camp without having to tire their mount. They set off in pursuit of Dumnacos, in accordance with the orders received, surprising his army on the march and throwing themselves on these fleeing men, demoralized, loaded with their baggage, they kill a large number of them and make an important booty. After this happy operation, they return to the camp.
28. The following night, Fabius sends his cavalry forward with the mission of hooking the enemy and delaying the march of the whole army, while awaiting his arrival. To ensure the execution of his orders, Quintus Atius Varus, prefect of the cavalry, a man whose courage and intelligence put him beyond compare, exhorted his troops and, having joined the enemy column, placed part of his squadrons in positions propitious, while with the others he engages in cavalry combat. The enemy horsemen fight with a particular audacity, because they feel supported by the infantrymen: those, indeed, from one end to the other of the column, make halt and carry themselves against our horsemen, with the help of theirs. . The fight is hot. Our men, who despised an enemy defeated the day before and who knew that the legions followed at a short distance, thinking that they would dishonor themselves if they yielded and wanting the whole fight to be their work, fight with the greatest courage against the infantry; as for the enemy, strong from the experience of the day before, he imagined that no other troops would come, and he believed he had found an opportunity to annihilate our cavalry.
29. As they had been fighting for some time with extreme relentlessness, Dumnacos put his troops in battle order, so that they could protect the horsemen by regularly taking turns: suddenly appearing, marching in tight ranks, the legions. At this sight, trouble seizes the enemy squadrons, the line of infantry is struck with terror, and, while the column of baggage is in complete confusion, they flee in all directions, uttering loud cries, in a frantic race. Our horsemen, who just now, when the enemy held firm, had fought bravely, now, in the intoxication of victory, are hearing an immense shout from all sides and envelop the enemy who is slipping away. ; as long as their horses have the strength to pursue and their arms to strike, they kill incessantly. More than twelve thousand men, whether they had arms in their hands or had thrown them in panic, were massacred, and the whole baggage train was captured.
30. As it was known that after this rout the Sénon Drappès, who, from the beginning of the Gaulish uprising, had gathered people from all sides without consent, called the slaves to freedom, brought to him those banished from all the cities, welcomed the thieves, and intercepted the baggage and supply convoys of the Romans, as it was known that this Drappès had formed with the remains of the fleeing army a troop reaching at most two thousand men and marching on the Province, that he had as an accomplice the Cadurque Luctérios who, at the beginning of the Gallic revolt, had proposed, as we have seen in the preceding commentary, to invade the Province, the legate Caninius set off in pursuit with two legions , not wishing that the Province should suffer or that fear should take hold of it, and that thus we should be dishonored by the robberies of a criminal gang.
31. Caius Fabius, with the rest of the army, goes to the Carnutes and the other peoples whose forces he knew had been very tested in the battle he had fought at Dumnacus. He had no doubt, in fact, that the defeat which had just been inflicted on them would make them less proud, but no more than, if he gave them time, they could not, excited by this same Dumnacos, raise the head. In this instance, Fabius had the good fortune to be able to proceed, in the submission of the cities, with the happiest promptness. The Carnutes, who, although often tried, had never spoken of peace, give hostages and submit; the other cities, located on the borders of Gaul, touching the ocean, and which are called Armorican, led by the example of the Carnutes, immediately fulfill, on the approach of Fabius and his legions, the conditions imposed . Dumnacos, driven from his country, had, wandering and hiding, to seek refuge in the most withdrawn part of Gaul.
32. But Drappès and with him Luctérios, knowing that Caninius and his legions were very close and certainly thinking themselves lost if they penetrated the territory of the Province with an army on their heels, moreover having no longer the possibility of freely to roam the countryside by committing robberies, stop in the country of the Cadurques. Lucterios had formerly enjoyed there, before the defeat, a great influence over his fellow citizens, and now even his incitements to revolt met with great credit among these Barbarians: he occupied with his troops and those of Drappès the city of Uxellodunum , who had been in his practice; it was a place remarkably defended by nature; he won over the inhabitants to his cause.
33. Caius Caninius came there immediately; realizing that the place was defended on all sides by sheer rocks, the climbing of which, even in the absence of any defender, was difficult for men carrying their arms, seeing, on the other hand, that he was in the city a great quantity of baggage, and that if one tried to flee secretly carrying it away, it was not possible to escape not only the cavalry, but even the legionnaires, he divided his cohorts into three corps and established them in three camps placed on very high points; starting from there, he undertook to build little by little, according to his numbers, an intrenchment which went around the town.
34. At this sight, those who were in the city, tormented by the tragic memory of Alesia, began to fear a siege of the same kind; Lucterios, who had lived through those hours, was the first to remind us that we had to worry about having wheat; the leaders therefore decide, unanimously, to leave part of the troops there and to leave themselves, with soldiers without baggage, to fetch wheat. The plan is approved, and the following night, leaving two thousand soldiers in the place, Drappes and Lucterios lead the others away. They remain only a few days absent, and take a great quantity of corn on the territory of Cadurques, of which a part wished to help them by supplying them, and the other could not prevent them from providing themselves; they also, more than once, make nocturnal expeditions against our posts. For this reason, Caninius was in no hurry to surround the whole place with a fortified line; he feared that once completed it would be impossible for him to defend it, or that, if he established a large number of posts, they had only too few effectives.
35. Having made an ample supply of wheat, Drappes and Lucterios established themselves at a place which was not more than ten miles from the place, and from where they intended to send the wheat there little by little. little. They divide up the task: Drappès remains in the camp, to guard it, with part of the troops, Luctérios leads the convoy towards the city. When he reached the edge of the square, he set up protective posts and, around the tenth hour of the night, began to introduce wheat by taking narrow paths through the woods. But the watchmen of the camp hear the noise of this troop on the march, scouts are sent to report what is happening, and Caninius, promptly, with the cohorts who were under arms in the neighboring posts, charges the outfitters at the first light of the night. day. Those, surprised, take fright and flee on all sides towards the troops of protection as soon as ours sees these last, the sight of men in arms still increases their ardor, and they do not take a single prisoner. Lucterios manages to escape with a handful of men, but he does not return to the camp.
36. After this happy operation, Caninius learns from prisoners that part of the troops remained with Drappès in a camp not more than twelve miles away. Having assured himself of the fact by a large number of testimonies, he saw clearly that, since one of the two chiefs had been put to flight, it would be easy to surprise and crush those who remained; but he also knew that it would be a great chance if no survivor had returned to the camp and brought the news of the disaster to Drappès; nevertheless, as he saw no risk in trying his luck, he sent forward towards the enemy camp all the German cavalry and infantry, who were extremely agile; he himself, after having distributed one legion among the three camps, takes the other in battle dress. Having arrived at a short distance from the enemy, the scouts he had preceded told him that, according to the usual practice of the Barbarians, they had left the heights to establish their camp on the banks of the river; the Germans and the horsemen nevertheless fell upon them unexpectedly and engaged in combat. Armed with this information, he leads his legion there, armed and lined up for battle. The troops, at a given signal, springing up from all sides, occupy the heights. Thereupon, the Germans and the horsemen, at the sight of the ensigns of the legion, redouble their ardor. Without stopping, the cohorts, from all sides, rush: all the enemies are killed or taken, and a great booty is made. Drappès himself was taken prisoner during the action.
37. Caninius, after this affair so happily conducted, with hardly any injuries, returns to besiege the people of Uxellodunum and, now rid of the external enemy, whose fear had hitherto prevented him from dispersing his forces in posts and to invest the place completely, he orders that one work everywhere with the fortification. Laius Fabius arrives the next day with his troops, and takes charge of an investment sector.
38. However Caesar leaves his quaestor Marcus Antonius with fifteen cohorts among the Bellovaci, so that the Belgians cannot once again form plans for revolt. He himself goes to other peoples, gets new hostages delivered, brings back healthy ideas to minds that were all in the grip of fear. Arrived at the Carnutes, of whom Caesar recounted in the previous commentary how the war had arisen in their city, seeing that their alarms were particularly strong, because they were aware of the gravity of their fault, in order to release more quickly the whole of the population, it asks that one delivers to him, for the chastisement, Gutuater, principal culprit and author responsible for the war. Although the character no longer trusts even his own fellow citizens, nevertheless, each applying to look for him, he is promptly brought to the camp. Caesar, despite his natural clemency, was forced to hand him over to execution by the soldiers who had come in droves: they blamed all the dangers run, all the evils suffered during the war, on his account, and he had to be first beaten with rods until he lost consciousness, before the ax finished him off.
39. Caesar was among the Carnutes when he received successively several letters from Caninius informing him of what had been done concerning Drappes and Lucterios, and of the resistance to which the inhabitants of Uxellodunum persisted. Although their small number seemed to him contemptible, he nevertheless considered that their stubbornness had to be severely punished, so that the Gauls as a whole did not come to imagine that what they had lacked to stand up to the Romans, this was not strength, but constancy, and to prevent other cities, following this example, from seeking to make themselves free by taking advantage of advantageous positions: for all of Gaul, he was well aware, knew that he only had one summer left to spend in his Province, and if they could hold out during that time, then they would have nothing more to fear. He therefore left his legate Quintus Calenus, at the head of two legions, with orders to follow him at normal stages; as for him, with all the cavalry, he is going to join Caninius by forced marches.
40. His arrival at Uxellodunum surprised everyone; when he saw that the works of fortification completely surrounded the place, he judged that at no price could the siege be lifted; and as deserters had told him that the besieged had abundant supplies of corn, he wanted to try to deprive them of water. A river flowed through the middle of a deep valley that almost completely surrounded the mountain on which Uxellodunum stood. To divert the river, the ground did not lend itself to it: it flowed, indeed, at the foot of the mountain in the lowest part, so that in no place one could dig diversion ditches. But the besieged had access to it only by a difficult and steep descent: as long as ours defended the approach, they could neither approach the river, nor go up, to return, the steep slope, without exposing themselves. beatings and risk death. Realizing the difficulties encountered by the enemy, Caesar posted archers and slingers, even placed artillery at certain points opposite the easier slopes, and thus prevented the besieged from going to draw water. river water.
41. Then they all began to come and fetch water in one place, at the very foot of the city wall, where an abundant spring gushed out from the side that left free, for a length of about three hundred feet, the river circuit. Everyone wanted it to be possible to deny the besieged access to this source, but only Caesar saw the way. He undertook, facing the source, to push mantlets along the slope and build an earthwork of hard work and continual skirmishes. The besieged, in fact, descending at a run from their position which dominated ours, fought from afar without having anything to fear and wounded a large number of our men who persisted in advancing; however, this does not prevent our soldiers from advancing the mantlets and, by dint of fatigue and work, from overcoming the difficulties of the terrain. At the same time, they dig underground conduits in the direction of the streams of water and the source where these end; this kind of work could be accomplished without any danger and without the enemy suspecting it. They built an earthwork sixty feet high, they installed a ten-storey tower there, which doubtless did not reach the height of the walls (there was no work which made it possible to obtain this result), but which , at least, dominated the place where the source was born. From the top of this tower, artillery threw projectiles at the point from which it was approached, and the besieged could not come to fetch water without risking their lives, so that not only the cattle and beasts of burden , but still the numerous population of the city suffered from thirst.
42. Such a grave threat alarms the besieged, who, filling barrels with tallow, pitch and thin slats of wood, cause them to roll in flames over our works. At the same time, they engage in a fierce combat, so that the Romans, occupied in a dangerous struggle, cannot think of putting out the fire. A violent fire suddenly broke out in the middle of our works. Indeed, everything that had been launched on the slope, being stopped by the mantlets and by the terrace, set fire to these very obstacles. However, our soldiers, in spite of the difficulties created for them by such a perilous kind of combat and the disadvantage of the position, faced everything with the greatest courage. The action, in fact, was taking place on a height, in full view of our army, and loud cries were uttered on both sides. So each one exposed himself to enemy darts and flames with all the more audacity the more reputation he had, seeing in this a means that his value should be better known and better attested.
43. Caesar, seeing that a large number of his men were wounded, orders the cohorts to mount from all sides to attack the mountain and to push everywhere shouts to make believe that they are occupying the walls. This is done, and the besieged, greatly alarmed, for they did not know what to suppose about what was happening elsewhere, recall the soldiers who were attacking our works and disperse them on the wall. Thus the fight ends and our men have quickly done either to extinguish the fire or to make part of the fire. The resistance of the besieged was prolonged, obstinate, and although a large number of them had died of thirst, they did not yield in the end, the rivulets which fed the source were cut by our underground channels and diverted from their course. . Then the spring, which never dried up, was suddenly dried up, and the besieged suddenly felt so irretrievably lost that they saw there the effect not of human industry, but of divine will. So, yielding to necessity, they surrendered.
44. Caesar knew that his kindness was known to all and he had no need to fear that the cruelty of his character would be explained as an act of rigor; as, on the other hand, he did not see the completion of his designs, if others, on various points of Gaul, launched out in similar enterprises, he considered that it was necessary to divert them by an exemplary punishment. . Consequently, he cut off the hands of all those who had borne arms and granted them their lives, so that it would be better known how he punished the rebels. Drappès, who, as I have said, had been taken prisoner by Caninius, either because he could not bear the humiliation of being in irons, or because he feared the torments of a cruel torture, abstained for a few days of food and starved to death. At the same time Lucterios, whom I have reported had been able to flee from the battle, had come to put himself in the hands of the Arverne Epasnactos: he indeed often changed his residence, and did not confide not long to the same guest, for, knowing how much Caesar must hate him, he considered any stay of any length dangerous: the Arverne Epasnactos, who was a great friend of the Roman people, without any hesitation had him loaded with chains and brought him to Caesar.
45. However, Labienus, among the Treveri, fights a successful cavalry battle: he kills many of them, as well as the Germans, who refused no people help against the Romans, takes their leaders alive, and among them the 'Hedui Suros, a man of renowned courage and illustrious birth, who, alone among the Aedui, had not yet laid down his arms.
46. At this news, Caesar, who saw that everywhere in Gaul the situation was favorable to him and judged that Gaul proper had been, by the campaigns of the preceding years, completely defeated and subjugated, which, on the other hand, did not had never been to Aquitaine himself, but had only gained there, thanks to Publius Crassus, a partial victory, set out, at the head of two legions, for that part of Gaul, with the intention of use the end of the season. This expedition, like the others, was conducted rapidly and successfully; all the cities of Aquitaine sent him deputies and gave him hostages. After that, he left for Narbonne with an escort of horsemen, leaving to his legates the task of putting the army into winter quarters: he established four legions among the Belgians, under the orders of the legates Marcus Antonius, Caïus Trébonius and Publius Vatinius; two were taken to the Aedui, whom he knew to possess the most considerable influence over all Gaul; two others, among the Turons, on the frontier of the Carnutes, were to maintain in obedience all this region as far as the ocean; the last two were placed among the Lémovices, not far from Arvernes, so that no part of Gaul would be empty of troops. He remained only a few days in the Province: he quickly visited all the centers of audience, judged the political conflicts, rewarded the services rendered it was, in fact, very easy for him to realize the feelings of each one towards Rome during the general uprising in Gaul, which the fidelity and help of the said Province had enabled him to resist. When he had finished, he returned to his legions in Belgium and wintered at Nemetocenna.
47. There he learns that Commios the Atrebate has given battle to his cavalry. Antony had arrived in his winter quarters, and the Atrebates were quiet; but Commios, since the wound of which I have spoken above, was unceasingly at the disposal of his fellow-citizens for every kind of trouble, ready to furnish those who wanted war an agitator and a leader while his city obeyed the Romans. , he engaged, with his cavalry, in acts of robbery on which he lived, he and his band, infesting the roads and intercepting a number of convoys intended for the winter quarters of the Romans.
48. Antony had under his orders as prefect of the cavalry Caius Volusénus Quadratus who was to spend the winter with him. He sends him in pursuit of enemy horsemen. Volusenus, besides being a man of rare courage, hated Commios: so he gladly obeyed. Having organized ambushes, he attacked his horsemen frequently, and always with success. At the end, during an engagement more lively than the others, Volusénus, carried away by the desire to seize the person of Commios, had persisted in pursuing him with a small group, and he, fleeing at all bridle, had led Volusenus a good distance away, when suddenly Commios, who hated him, appealed to the honor of his companions, asking them to help him, not to leave unvenged the wounds he owed to the deceit of this man, and, turning bridle, he audaciously separates himself from the others to rush at the prefect. All his horsemen imitate him, turn ours, which were not in force, and pursue them. Commios furiously spurred his horse, pushed it against that of Quadratus, and, throwing himself on his enemy, speared him forward, with great violence, he pierced his thigh. When they see their prefect hit, ours do not hesitate: they stop fleeing and, turning their horses against the enemy, push him back. Then a great number of enemies, jostled by the violence of our charge, are wounded, and some are trampled under the feet of horses in pursuit, while others are taken prisoner; their leader, thanks to the speed of his mount, avoided this misfortune; thus, it was a victory but the prefect, seriously attacked by Commios and appearing in danger of death, was brought back to the camp. However Commios, either because he had satisfied his resentment, or because he had lost most of his family, sends deputies to Antoine and promises, under security of hostages, to have such a stay as he will prescribe, d To carry out what he will order he asks only one thing, that is to save his fear by preventing him from appearing before a Roman. Antoine, judging that his request was inspired by a legitimate fear, granted it and received his hostages.
49. Caesar, wintering in Belgium had no other purpose than to keep the cities in our alliance, to avoid giving any of them hope or a pretext for war. Nothing, in fact, seemed to him less desirable than to see himself forced into a war, at the moment of his discharge, and to leave behind him, when he should lead his army, a war in which all of Gaul, having nothing to fear for the moment, would throw himself willingly. Also, by treating the cities with honour, by very generously rewarding the principal citizens, by avoiding imposing any new charge, he easily maintained peace in Gaul that so many defeats had exhausted and to whom he made obedience sweeter. .
50. He left against his custom, the winter ended, and by forcing the stages, for Italy, in order to speak to the municipalities and the communities to which he had recommended his quaestor Marcus Antonius, candidate for the priesthood. He supported him, in fact, with all his credit, because he was happy to serve a close friend whom he had just authorized to go forward to act as a candidate, but also because he strongly desired to fight the intrigues of a powerful minority who wanted, by causing Antony to fail, to ruin Caesar's credit when he left office. Although he had learned on the way, before reaching Italy, that Antony had been appointed augur, he nevertheless considered that he had no less reason to visit the municipalities and the colonies, in order to thank them. of their numerous and eager votes for Antony, and also to recommend his own candidacy for the elections of the following year: his adversaries, in fact, triumphed insolently over the success of Lucius Lentulus and Caius Marcellus who, appointed consuls, proposed to despoil Caesar of all office, of all dignity, and of the failure of Servius Galba who, although he was much more popular and had obtained many more votes, had been frustrated from the consulship because he was Caesar's friend and had been his legates.
51. Caesar's arrival was greeted by all municipalities and colonies with incredible expressions of respect and affection. It was, in fact, the first time he had come there since the great general uprising in Gaul. Nothing was neglected of everything that could be imagined to decorate the doors, the paths, all the places through which Caesar had to pass. The entire population, with the children, came to meet him, victims were immolated everywhere, the squares and temples, where tables had been set, were taken by assault: one could taste in advance the joys of an impatiently awaited triumph. Such was the magnificence displayed by the rich, and the enthusiasm displayed by the poor.
52. After having traversed all the parts of Cisalpine Gaul, Caesar returned with the greatest promptitude to his troops at Nemetocenna: having sent to the legions, in all the winter quarters, the order to move towards the territory of the Treveri, he went there himself and reviewed his army there. He gave Titus Labienus the command of the Cisalpine, so that his candidacy for the consulship would be well supported in that country. As for him, he only moved about as much as he deemed useful, for the hygiene of the troops, to change quarters. Numerous rumors reached him concerning the intrigues of his enemies with Labienus, and he was informed that, under the inspiration of some, they were trying to provoke an intervention of the Senate to strip him of a part of his troops; nevertheless, he could not be made to believe anything about Labienus, nor to make him undertake anything against the authority of the Senate. He thought, indeed, that if the senators voted freely he would easily obtain justice. Laïus Curion, tribune of the plebs, who had made himself the defender of Caesar and his threatened dignity, had several times made the following commitment before the Senate if Caesar's military power worried anyone, and since, on the other hand, the absolute power and the armaments of Pompey aroused in the citizens fears which were not mediocre, he proposed that one and the other disarm and disband his troops at once, the republic would recover freedom and the independence. He did not limit himself to this commitment, but he even took the initiative of provoking a vote in the Senate; the consuls and friends of Pompey opposed it, and on this dilatory manoeuvre, the assembly broke up.
53. Here was an important testimony to the sentiments of the whole Senate, and which corroborated the lesson of an earlier incident. Marcus Marcellus, the year before, seeking to overthrow Caesar, had, in violation of a law of Pompey and Crassus, placed on the agenda of the Senate, before the time, the question of the provinces of the proconsul; as, after discussion, he put his proposition to the vote, Marcellus, who expected from his attacks against Caesar the satisfaction of all his political ambitions, had seen the Senate agree en masse to the contrary opinion. But these failures did not discourage Caesar's enemies: they only warned them to have to find more forceful means of pressure, by means of which they could force the Senate to approve what they alone wanted.
54. Then a senatus-consultum decides that Cneus Pompey and Caius Caesar should each send a legion for the Parthian war; but it is quite clear that two are taken from the same. Indeed, Cneus Pompey gave, as coming from his contingent, the first legion, which he had sent to Caesar after having raised it in the province of Caesar himself. The latter, however, although the intentions of his adversaries left no doubt, sent the legion back to Pompey and gave on his own account, in execution of the senatus-consultum, the fifteenth, which was in Citerior Gaul. In its place, he sends the thirteenth to Italy, to garrison the posts which it evacuated. He assigns, on the other hand, winter quarters to his army: Laius Trebonius is placed in Belgium with four legions; Laïus Fabius is sent with the same numbers to the Aedui. He considered, in fact, that the best means of ensuring the tranquility of Gaul was to contain, by the presence of troops, the Belgians, who were the bravest, and the Aedui, who had the most influence. He then left for the Italian.
55. On his arrival, he learns that the two legions which he had dismissed and which, according to the senatus-consultum, were intended for the Parthian war, the consul Caius Marcellus had given them to Pompey, and that they kept them in Italy. After that, no one could any longer doubt what was being plotted against Caesar; the latter, however, resolved to suffer everything, as long as he had any hope of obtaining a legal solution to the conflict instead of having recourse to arms. He endeavored...
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